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“A philosophy that is not timely but timeless is not 
a philosophia perennis, which unreasonably claims 
unbounded validity over past and future intellec-
tual positions, but a stagnant philosophy, unable 
to contribute, keep track of, and interact with, the 
cultural evolution that philosophical reflection it-
self has helped to bring about, and hence to flour-
ish.” 
(Floridi, 2011, p. 12) 
  
 
1. A Provocation 
 
There once was a philosopher not to be named F1F, who betrayed his teacher and 
in so doing made a mess of “the profession.” This master remarked that no 
great philosopher was wrong, but that each reported on how we stood in rela-
tion to being during his historical epoch. While naming him may lead to im-
mediate dismissal, he nonetheless stirred the pot and in so doing tried to revi-
talize a profession that was languishing in his midst. This man was no relativ-
ist, but one who sought only to make philosophy relevant again. For what 
could make the history of philosophy more relevant than to read it as a record 
of human transformation rather than a competition to find the one truth that 
could stand still for all time? That man was part poet, part philosopher, part 
provocateur; and with that insight, he managed to uncover more than most 
previous philosophers covered over in a lifetime. Those who know him al-
ready know of whom I speak; those who don‟t will already be harboring sus-
picions. 
                                                            
 1 I am here heeding the advice of John Haugeland, who once told me privately to refer to 
this man only as “the master”. 
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What does this Kierkegaardian invocation have to do with Luciano Flo-
ridi‟s The Philosophy of Information? To start, it suggests three things of im-
portance about philosophy, namely, that any philosophy of import – and let 
us not forget that those with no import are also not remembered – 1) is em-
bodied in the ethos of a time and 2) set to answer questions that are pressing 
for its day. Consequently, 3) genuine philosophy changes over time. If it does 
not, it gets stuck in sedimented thought, bickers over trivialities, risks irrele-
vance and loses its ability to transform the world. It would be no mere opin-
ion to suggest that institutionalized philosophy currently finds itself in this 
very boat. We who work in the profession may love what we do, but to those 
outside the ivory tower, talk of twin earth, zombies, swamp men and doppel-
gängers sounds no more or less legitimate than talk of phenomenological re-
ductions, hermeneutic readings, and postmodern eschatology. Even within 
the academy the same can often be said for some scholars in our own disci-
pline and most in the others. Yet, many philosophers from both sides of the 
divide seem to think that our disciplinary problems can be solved by one de-
cree: "Stupid people out!" With this in mind, institutional philosophy should 
not lament its inability to address the world, given that it has so adamantly 
insisted on it. 
Still, the situation may not be as dismal as it might first seem. We've 
been in this boat before, and, besides, philosophy still thrives in the intersti-
ces of (or in relation with) other disciplines where there is real work to be 
done. Good examples are visible in conjunction with ethics, cognitive science, 
and the integrated study of the history and philosophy of science more gener-
ally. We may therefore hold out the hope that the relevant and timely phi-
losophy on the sidelines might find itself once again in the middle of game. To 
be sure, it's not too late, but we may have to work to make it so. 
 
 
2. On the Structure of Philosophical Revolutions (Briefly) 
 
Just as there are scientific revolutions, so too are there philosophical ones, 
though, so far as I know, a recent analysis of the "structure of philosophical 
revolutions" taking into account the current state of the profession, along 
with an enumeration of pertinent catalysts for philosophical change, has yet 
to be fully worked out. If we are to address the current philosophical “crisis” 
(literally, “turning point”) in any fruitful way, perhaps the time is right for 
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just such an investigation. Section 1.4 of Floridi's recent book heads in this di-
rection, though his comments must be scant (as they are), since his book pur-
sues another agenda, and this digress on philosophical change is set to a par-
ticular task. Nonetheless, in what follows, I will briefly outline Floridi‟s views 
and then broaden them slightly to suggest a more historicized, information-
technological perspective on philosophical change than he articulates here. 
Floridi addresses his comments under the name of the "dialectic of reflec-
tion" (p. 7). Though citing analytic sources and appearing in an analytic 
book, the theory also has a bit of a continental ring to it, which, as I will em-
phasize later, is a benefit and not a deficit in Floridi's overall work. Crossing 
this great philosophical divide must be seen as an achievement in this day 
and age, as others (e.g., Haugeland 1998, Clark 1996, Gallagher and Zahavi 
2007, etc.) have also realized. The seeds of his theory are aptly sketched in a 
single paragraph: “In order to emerge and flourish, the mind needs to make 
sense of its environment by continuously investing data ... with meaning. 
Mental life is thus the result of a successful reaction to a primary horror vacui 
semantici: meaningless (in the non-existentialist sense of „not-yet-meaningful‟) 
chaos threatens to tear the Self asunder, to drown it in an alienating otherness 
perceived by the Self as nothingness, and this primordial dread of annihila-
tion urges the Self to go on filling any semantically empty space with what-
ever meaning the Self can muster, as successfully as the cluster of contextual 
constraints, affordances, and the development of culture permit. This giving 
meaning to, and making sense of reality (semanticization of Being), or reac-
tion of the Self to the non-Self (to phrase it in Fichtean terms), consists in the 
inheritance and further elaboration, maintenance, and refinement of factual 
narratives: personal identity, ordinary experience, community ethos, family 
values, scientific theories, common-sense-constituting beliefs, and so forth. 
These are logically and contextually, and hence sometimes fully, constrained 
and constantly challenged both by the data that they need to accommodate 
and explain and by the reasons why they are developed. Ideally, the evolu-
tion of this process tends towards an ever-changing, richer, and robust fram-
ing of the world.” (pp. 7-8) 
A careful examination of this passage indicates a theory of philosophical 
development, not of a continual string of new beginnings, since there are both 
constraining influences that hold back the flow of ideas and historical mo-
mentum that pushes it forward. Yet, as Floridi, notes, new philosophies can-
not move too quickly or they risk being dismissed; at the same time, they 
must move to stay relevant.  
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The negative component of this dialectic (negative only in the sense that 
it restrains) “consists in the inheritance … of factual narratives.” Putting 
aside for the moment that data also constrain, the positive component con-
sists in the fact that old ideas, theories, methods, etc., are “constantly chal-
lenged” by new data, agendas, and paradigms. To cite an obvious example, 
we may consider the case of Descartes. Changes in science since the 17th Cen-
tury and shifting theological ideologies mean that we cannot simply lift Des-
cartes out of his place in time and set him competitively next to the contem-
porary philosopher. He is bound to lose, and it is easy to see why, once we 
remember that Descartes could no more identify the nervous system as elec-
trochemical before the discoveries of Galvani (1737-1798) and Dalton (1766-
1844) any more than he could have contextualized his thoughts on the rela-
tionship between mind and body in the context of contemporary neurosci-
ence. Yet, and this should not be underestimated, contemporary philosophy 
owes a debt to Descartes for helping to establish the very framework in which 
contemporary questions are asked. It is doubtful that we could have found 
our way from Aquinas to now without his engagement with the ideas of his 
time, (and, to be sure, we would never have made it from Plato to Aquinas 
without Aquinas‟ engagement with the ideas of his time.) 
To summarize the dialectic, then, old philosophical frameworks try to ac-
commodate new data in light of new agendas and paradigms and this, in turn, 
forces them to innovate. They bend and sometimes break, allowing space for 
new (but not entirely novel) ideas. However, as with other disciplines and, in-
deed, other facets of technological and social development, this movement 
across history is not constant. Sometimes it moves by leaps and bounds; 
sometimes it seems to stop almost completely. Floridi refers to these periods 
of slow philosophical development as “scholasticism,” described as “institu-
tionalised philosophy at its worst.” “It manifests itself as a pedantic and of-
ten intolerant adherence to some discourse (teachings, methods, values, view-
points, canons of authors, positions, theories, or selections of problems etc.), 
set by a particular group (a philosopher, a school of thought, a movement, a 
trend, a fashion), at the expense of other alternatives, which are ignored or 
opposed. It fixes, as permanently and objectively as possible, a toolbox of 
philosophical concepts and vocabulary suitable for standardizing its discourse 
(its special isms) and the research agenda of the community. In this way, 
scholasticism favours the professionalization of philosophy: scholastics are 
„lovers‟ who detest the idea of being amateurs and wish to become profes-
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sional.” (p. 9) “To be sure, the choice of the term “scholasticism” is not acci-
dental, (nor is the irony of wanting to be a “lover” who detests being an 
“amateur”). Though “scholasticism” is not meant here to refer to the late 
Medieval period of philosophy regarding content, it nonetheless does so re-
garding the structure of philosophical revolution. Again, one need only con-
sider Descartes‟ battle with the historical Scholastics (this time with a capital 
“S”) in light of the case of Galileo. The problem of that day was to square phi-
losophy with newly available scientific discoveries unearthed by new methods 
without moving so quickly as to be condemned. In so doing, Descartes and his 
contemporaries broke free from philosophical deadlock in an age in which dis-
senters were dismissed as heretics to allow philosophy to flourish again in the 
climate of the Enlightenment, as indeed it did. There is, indeed, something 
truly “modern” about Modern Philosophy, particularly in contrast to Medie-
val Scholasticism, which is perhaps best characterized as sedimented and the-
ologized Greek philosophy. Fairly, one could say that for this very reason phi-
losophy departments cannot get by without a course on Early Modern Phi-
losophy and yet feel quite comfortable leaving out Medieval. 
Though Floridi notes that “once scholasticism is closed in upon itself, its 
main purpose becomes quite naturally the perpetuation of its own discourse, 
transforming itself into academic strategy” (p. 10), he nonetheless acknowl-
edges its inevitability. “Any stage in the semanticization of Being is destined 
to be initially innovative if not disruptive, to establish itself as a specific 
dominant paradigm, and hence to become fixed and increasingly rigid, further 
reinforcing itself, until it finally acquires an intolerant stance towards alter-
native conceptual innovations, and so becomes incapable of dealing with the 
ever-changing intellectual environment that it helped to create and mould. In 
this sense, every intellectual movement generates the conditions of its own 
senescence and replacement.” (p. 10) 
New philosophies are, in other words, destined to become old, as they sow 
the seeds for their own destruction. In their pure decontextualized and ahis-
torical form, they belong to the museum of antiquities, nonetheless important 
for the seeds that they have sown and the history of human thought that 
they record.  
The question put before us, then, in this section of Floridi‟s book is 
whether contemporary philosophy is currently in this predicament, that is, 
whether it has become “scholastic,” and whether it is time to jar it loose. 
Given the placement of this section in The Philosophy of Information, one 
would rightfully guess that Floridi‟s answer is yes, and, again, when we look 
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at the current state of institutional philosophy in light of the world‟s prob-
lems, we might (should?) be inclined to agree. But is he right about philoso-
phical revolution, and if so, what has changed that could precipitate a revolu-
tion at this time? I will address the second question first. 
 
 
3. Some Catalysts for Change in the Climate of Ideas 
 
There are two positive forces that lead to philosophical innovation on 
Floridi‟s view, both external to the philosophical system itself: “the substan-
tial novelties in the environment of the conceptual system, occurring also as a 
result of the semantic work done by the old paradigm itself; and the appear-
ance of an innovative paradigm, capable of dealing with them more success-
fully, and thus of disentangling the conceptual system from its stagnation” 
(p. 11). Though Floridi doesn‟t mention it, both were a part of freeing Modern 
Philosophy from the clutches of Scholasticism, traditionally conceived. They 
are explicitly acknowledged by Descartes, who attempted to design a philoso-
phical method along the lines of a mathesis universalis in his Rules for the Di-
rection of the Mind (1628/1985). Mathematical methods were making good 
progress at the time, thereby introducing a new foundation for a philosophi-
cal method which he thought could be applied to old questions to forge an-
swers consonant with a new science. In so doing, he inaugurated new para-
digms in both metaphysics and epistemology. Spinoza and Leibniz both fol-
lowed in the wake of this mathematization of philosophical method, which is 
still apparent in contemporary views on logic-based inference today. Theo-
logical reformation in the background, particularly regarding the priority of 
reason over faith, a subtle inversion of the commitment of faith over reason 
that grounded Medieval theology in reason without losing its mystery, also 
played a role in opening the space of philosophical inquiry. This is easily seen 
in the fact that Descartes was Catholic (though the strength of his commit-
ment is a matter of some debate), but not the Jewish Spinoza and Lutheran 
Leibniz, who nonetheless could be mainstream players in the context of minor 
(Catholic) background players whose names we know but speak of only 
rarely, e.g., Mersenne, Arnauld and Gassendi. This “mathematical turn” in 
the 17th Century accounts in part for the arrival of analytic philosophy, 
which will do its work and sediment in time in opposition to that other strand 
prominent in the modern philosophical climate, continental philosophy.  
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Both analytic and continental philosophy stem from the same sources, 
the methods, metaphysics and epistemology of Descartes, as two children 
from one parent. In the case of continental philosophy, the notion that phi-
losophy could start with introspection and use reason to reverse engineer its 
way back to some external world that was hiding (fictively, for Hume) behind 
our perceptions inaugurated a new set of questions. Transcendental philoso-
phy began this way as a description of experience from “inside”. Lawhead 
(2001) and Deibert (1997) attribute this maneuver and others like it – Francis 
Bacon‟s optimism about method, for instance – to a kind of epistemic protes-
tantism that, like its religious counterpart, promised individual access to the 
truth over and above the dogmatics of inherited tradition. Such a view is im-
mediately apparent in the opening passages of Descartes‟ Meditations on First 
Philosophy (1641/1984) and perhaps finds its greatest expression in the grand 
philosophical architecture of Kant. It too will sediment in time, as transcen-
dental philosophy (via Husserl) tries to rescue itself from the threat of psy-
chologism (another external pressure from the emerging science of psychol-
ogy) and make philosophy an “exact science.” 
Other catalysts for this division go back further to the socio-political 
transformations of the 19th century as the modern states that emerged in the 
Enlightenment underwent their own evolution, giving rise to a new politic 
and a new global (for its time) awareness that would make philosophy a cos-
mopolitan affair creating the camps as we know them today, French and 
German philosophy against British and American. That we‟ve been caught in 
this divide for more than a century now is surely a sign that we are in another 
epoch of “scholasticism” and are confronting another opportunity for phi-
losophy to wrench itself free from arcane irrelevance and speak to the world 
again. But why now? 
New positive forces are, according to Floridi, present on the scene inviting 
a re-appropriation of the philosophical enterprise. “Nowadays, the pulling 
force of innovation is represented by the complex world of information and 
communication phenomena, their corresponding sciences and technologies 
and the new environments, social life, existential and cultural issues that they 
have brought about. This is why [the philosophy of information] can present 
itself as an innovative paradigm” (p. 12). These external forces cannot be ig-
nored, due to their magnitude and their sudden acceleration. As Floridi notes 
elsewhere: “To have some simple, quantitative measure of the transforma-
tions experienced by our generation, consider the following findings. In a re-
cent study, researchers at Berkeley's School of Information Management and 
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Systems estimated that humanity had accumulated approximately 12 ex-
abytes of data in the course of its entire history until the commodification of 
computers, but that it had produced more than 5 exabytes of data just in 
2002: „print, film, magnetic, and optical storage media produced about 5 ex-
abytes of new information in 2002. Ninety-two percent of the new informa-
tion was stored on magnetic media, mostly in hard disks. [...] Five exabytes of 
information is equivalent in size to the information contained in 37,000 new 
libraries the size of the Library of Congress book collections‟ (Lyman and 
Varian [2003]). In 2002, this was almost 800 MB of recorded data produced 
per person. It is like saying that every newborn baby came into the world 
with a burden of 30 feet of books, the equivalent of 800 MB of data on paper. 
This exponential escalation has been relentless: „between 2006 and 2010 [...] 
the digital universe will increase more than six fold from 161 exabytes to 988 
exabytes.‟” (2009, p. 154) 
These numbers are impressive, but those of us over the age of forty 
scarcely need them. We need only look around at the ubiquity of information 
and communications technologies and the sheer size of a world-wide web that 
has yet to enter its third decade. (Indeed, in my childhood the cell phone was 
a distant technology for the 23rd-century world of Star Trek.) In addition, it is 
worth pointing out changes in the socio-political landscape as well: Facebook, 
for instance, created only seven years ago in 2004, is nearing 800 million 
members, making it the third largest civic organization on the planet after 
India and China and the largest social science database ever compiled in the 
history of the world! There can be no doubt that we are in a period of geomet-
rically-accelerating change creating new problems for philosophy – some 
pressing to the point of concerning the viability, meaning and identity of our 
species – and new methods for addressing them. One would have to be an os-
trich with his head in the sand not to see this fact. So, on this point, Floridi 
seems to be correct. Furthermore, the situation is desperate for the discipline 
of philosophy, but much more so for the preservation of a world (ecosphere 
and infosphere) that needs philosophers (not reactionaries) now more than 
ever. 
In light of the above, Floridi suggests that the time is right to learn from 
new paradigms and see where they may take us when addressing philosophi-
cal problems. Just as Descartes adopted mathematics as a model of inquiry, 
Floridi adopts the notion of Levels of Abstraction (LoAs) from object-
oriented programming in computer science and transforms it into the founda-
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tions of an information-based philosophical method. After laying out the 
“open questions in the philosophy of information” in Chapter Two of his 
book, he then presents the method in Chapter Three and then addresses sev-
eral outstanding philosophical problems to attempt solutions within a new in-
formational paradigm. It is not my purpose here to comment on the book as a 
whole or assess whether the initiative is successful; that work will be left to 
other venues (Beavers 2013a, 2013b). I will comment, however, in the section 
after next about Floridi‟s method in general, how it synthesizes both analytic 
and continental tendencies and why it (along with the notion of philosophical 
change more broadly) does not entail relativism. 
 
 
4. Entanglements with Information and Technology 
 
Before continuing with the above task, however, I wish to offer some of 
my own thoughts respecting the context for philosophical revolution that I 
believe supplement Floridi‟s theory above. Without going so far as to suggest 
that “the medium is the message” (McLuhan 1964/1994, p. 7), I wish to risk 
anachronism and cast philosophical transformation against the backdrop of 
changes in information technology. Such a move is justified for several rea-
sons. One is that while we currently claim “the information age” as the appel-
lation of the day, information has always been a part of human experience, 
even if we were not explicitly aware of it. Though, according to contemporary 
usage, it may sound strange to say that the information revolution is around 
5,000 years old, in geological or even evolutionary terms, this would still 
make it quite new. Second, there is precedent for looking at the role of devel-
oping technologies in scientific revolutions (Kuhn 1962), and since we are con-
sidering a discipline that trades in informational phenomena (i.e., ideas), it 
would seem appropriate to consider how informational technologies affect its 
development. Third, there is also philosophical precedent itself to “stand 
Hegel on his head” and follow Marx in examining how rearranging the mate-
rial conditions of a time may affect ideational change. 
In Beavers (2012), I suggested a few philosophical implications that fol-
low from four revolutions in the history of information that may prove in-
sightful here, even though they don‟t fit neatly with the same four scientific 
revolutions that provide the context for Floridi‟s immediate work on the 
“fourth revolution” (Floridi 2010). In this paper, I divide the history of in-
formation flow into four epochs: the 1) epigraphic, 2) printing, 3) multimedia, 
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and 4) digital, noting that as revolutions they always preserve something of 
the past and might better be thought of as waves that follow in the wake of 
previous technological development.  
The epigraphic revolution is characterized by the invention of writing, an 
era in which temporal speech could be coded in the spatial medium of writing, 
thereby allowing information to cross both temporal (i.e. historical) and spa-
tial boundaries. The printing revolution, starting around 1450, is characterized 
by the mass production of writing, an era in which writing acquired the abil-
ity to propagate quickly along different routes. The multimedia revolution, be-
ginning in the 1830s, is characterized by the industrialization of information 
flow and the introduction of audio and visual technologies that decoupled the 
dissemination of information from the transportation industry. Finally, the 
digital revolution, which began with the popularization of the personal com-
puter around 1980, inaugurated an era in which people appear in consort on 
an extended network intermixed with other, non-human information proces-
sors, all “inforgs” to use Floridi‟s term. 
While there are smaller, micro-movements that can be plotted on the 
above trajectory as well, the enumerated revolutions are unified by a common 
theme, namely one of introducing new devices that allowed the flow of infor-
mation to leap forward with sudden and dramatic force. Though it might be 
mere metaphor to say that information was destined from the start to find a 
way to travel as fast and far as possible, in short, to network as many minds 
to as many others as quickly and efficiently as possible, this has, nonetheless, 
been its collective effect. The history of information flow can thus be told 
from a networks perspective in which each era significantly rearranged the in-
formational networks that connect people to people (and then also to ma-
chines). At first travelling by sound created by modulating wave forms with 
the human voice to be decoded in the mechanisms of the human ear, thereby 
traveling only as far as allowed by sound waves amplified by repetition and 
rumor mills, massive amounts of information can now jump continents and 
oceans in parts of a second. 
While it might be too hard and fast to say that these revolutions directly 
caused transformations in the philosophical scene, they nonetheless coincided 
with important transitions in the discipline. In this regard, they are co-
incidental (hyphen intended), but not in the usual arbitrary sense of the term. 
There is a dependence relation between them that is perhaps best articulated 
by noting that philosophical changes in the discipline could not have hap-
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pened without technological change. Minimally, then, the latter is a necessary 
condition for the former. More so, however, insofar as information technologi-
cal change raises new issues, produces ancillary effects in the socio-political, 
economic, educational, etc. climate of the day, and rearranges the playing 
field for all aspects of human inquiry, it is not a necessary condition solely in 
the limited sense that it helps to move information faster and farther. Deibert 
notes, for instance, that “both writing and printing favor and encourage an 
abstract, rational cognitive orientation by arresting the flow of oral conversa-
tion, permitting the comparison and juxtaposition of words and documents, 
and detaching the content of communication from place, time, and personal-
ity” (p. 84). 
Such an orientation is visible in classical Greece, where the “oration” 
(text written to be read out loud) served to rearrange the institutions of law 
and, hence, community. Indeed, Cohen (1995) notes that blood feud was 
transposed into the Athenian court system, where battles could be fought out 
in argument, thereby creating a culture centered around rhetoric both for the 
sake of vengeance and social control. Schools of oratory grew up to teach the 
art of speech making (really, speech writing), the most famous of which was 
perhaps that of Isocrates. The sheer presence of the amount of Greek legal 
oratory we still possess in writing testifies to this fact. More important for the 
discipline of philosophy is the climate of sophistry that this created for which 
Plato‟s Academy could become an antidote. As Cohen aptly notes, “Para-
doxically, what have often been viewed by modern scholars as “abuses” of 
Athenian legal institutions may turn out to be intimately linked to Athenian 
understandings of the rule of law, understandings which saw the courts not as 
objective discoverers of “truth,” but as powerful instruments of democratic 
social control” (p. 9). Though talk of Plato and the sophists is the stuff of in-
troductory classes, this clash between persuasion and truth-telling nonethe-
less provides the critical context for understanding Plato‟s corpus and per-
haps justifies his skepticism over writing expressed in the Phaedrus. (For 
those unfamiliar with this text, it is worth noting that Phaedrus sets out to 
repeat orally a speech by the rhetorician/sophist Lysias when Socrates asks to 
see the actual speech in written form that Phaedrus is hiding under his coat 
and yet trying to recite from memory.) For the purposes of this commentary, 
the salient feature of this analysis is that Greek philosophy emerges in a social 
and political climate that has problematized the relationship between speech 
and writing. While not all philosophy that follows from this inception can be 
connected directly to this initial conflict, concerns over rhetoric, persuasion, 
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and the truth or falsity of argument in written form nonetheless continued 
well beyond Plato and culminated in the disputations of late Medieval Scho-
lasticism. 
To address this situation in light of Floridi‟s views on philosophical 
change, we should note that classical Greek philosophy did not emerge out of 
nowhere, but in light of social problems arising by confusion in the informa-
tion environment of the day and that may have led, at least on a Platonic 
reading, to the Athenian loss of the Peloponnesian War. Philosophy began, in 
other words, with a pressing need to sort out the true from the false in an age 
where the conflation of speech and writing made this necessary. Only in such 
a context could it make sense for Socrates (or anyone) to ask another to 
“hand over a speech” (on reflection, an odd locution) for scrutiny. 
 Although the Enlightenment and its precursor, the Renaissance, are of-
ten referred to as “neoclassical,” philosophically they were so only because of 
a renewed spirit of inquiry and not because they were recapitulations of Greek 
and Roman philosophy. To be sure, there are Platonic and Aristotelian ten-
dencies in both the Continental Rationalists and British Empiricists, but it 
would be a mistake to characterize any of them as either Platonists or Aristo-
telians. This is due in part to the spirit of “epistemic protestantism” I men-
tioned earlier, which bears a direct connection to the Reformation. Both 
Eisenstein (1983) and Deibert (1997), along with many others, recognize the 
critical role of the printing press in bringing about this new cultural move-
ment that broke the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church thereby mak-
ing room for new ideas, but other important conceptual transformations re-
sulted from the printing press as well. The mass production of writing encour-
aged literacy and a new sense of personal identity. The situation is nicely 
summarized by Deibert: “The gradual rise of individualism as both a prevail-
ing symbolic form and a predominant moral idea flourished in the printing 
environment. The mass production of printed material favored newly circu-
lating notions of authorship, copyright, and individual subjectivity, while the 
portability of printed books facilitated the trend toward silent, private read-
ing and intellectual isolation and reflection.” (p. 100) 
Furthermore, by quickly circulating texts in the vernacular, the revolu-
tion in printing contributed to the rise of the modern nation state and a new 
sense of national identity. Political treatises on how best to run a state 
emerged in record number. Machiavelli, Rousseau and Locke are worthy ex-
amples of people who reinvented social and political philosophy, each from a 
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different country and each with a different perspective. This cultural shift 
that favored text, private reading, intellectual isolation (i.e., thinking and 
writing on one‟s own) and national boundaries set the stage for the transna-
tional Republic of Letters that connected intellectuals from Europe and Amer-
ica in a network of ideas that included the first academic professional associa-
tions and journals. Coupled with the development of mathematics and the 
rise of science mentioned above, the stage was well-set for radical transforma-
tions in philosophy, due in no small part to the revolution in printing. 
It is easy to see how both Ancient and Early Modern Philosophy were fa-
cilitated by developments in information technology. However, the immedi-
ate relationship between informational and philosophical development is less 
apparent in 19th Century philosophy, partly due to the fact that as we move 
through history the pace of technological development increases along with 
philosophical development. This fact makes it more difficult to draw sharp 
distinctions or “breaks” between eras. In fact, it does appear that philosophi-
cal innovation flows smoothly from Kant through the 19th Century. One pos-
sible place where someone might be tempted to demarcate a post-Kantian pe-
riod of scholasticism is with Hegel (a neo-Kantian, let us not forget) and the 
“young Hegelians” that follow. Though Karl Löwith subtitled his famous 
study From Hegel to Nietzsche as Der revolutionäre Bruck des neunzehnten Jar-
bunderts (translated as The Revolution in 19th Century Thought), the period can 
best be described as a series of reactions to Hegel, or, if one thinks of Hegel as 
a neo-Kantian, then as a series of reactions to Kant. The difficulty, however, 
in characterizing this as scholasticism is that, even though it was largely reac-
tionary, it was, nonetheless, productive. Even so, the reaction was largely 
centered around a telling issue, the individual against an emerging mass soci-
ety, Hegel arguing on behalf of society (on some readings) and Marx, Kierke-
gaard and Nietzsche (along with others) advocating for the individual that 
was being exploited or lost in a herd. During this particular period of philoso-
phy it was as if philosophy was anticipating changes in information technol-
ogy that would come later in the century, or perhaps better put, that society 
itself was providing a vacuum that would need to be filled by such technolo-
gies.  
Though, as I noted above, the multimedia revolution begins in the 1830s, 
it doesn‟t really take off until the 1870s, too late for the Hegelian reactionar-
ies to be doing there work. A brief timeline of the development of information 
technologies makes this clear. Some of these (along with their approximate 
date of invention) include: Telegraphy in 1836; The Daguerreotype in 1839; 
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The Telegraphic Printer in 1856; The Stock Ticker in 1863; The Telephone in 
1877; The Phonograph in 1878; The Light Bulb and the Photophone in 1880; 
Wireless Telegraphy, Wax Cylinder Phonography and the Motion Picture 
Camera, all in 1891; The Rotary Telephone in 1898; Radio and Teletype in 
1906; Television in 1926; Electric Phonography in 1927; and Magnetic Tape 
in 1928. Innovation continued into the second half of the 20th Century with 
Cable Television in 1948; Cassette Tape Recorders in 1958; Touch Tone 
Phones in 1963; Color Television in 1966; and the VCR in 1969. This timeline 
clearly illustrates that throughout the second half of the 19th Century and af-
ter, society was exploding into a global communications environment. 
 At the same time, the 19th Century witnessed rapid development in sci-
ence and mathematics. It was the century of Cantor, Darwin, Doppler, Fara-
day, Gauss, Hertz, Helmholtz, Hilbert, Maxwell, Mendel, Mendeleev, Pavlov, 
and Riemann, to name but a few. As with the philosophical revolution of the 
Enlightenment, mathematical and scientific innovation too would be felt on 
the philosophical scene. However, if I am correct in the general outline of the 
theory I am here sketching and according to the timeline above, philosophy 
should not really wake up and take this into account until after around 1880, 
which seems to be the case. 
It is always dangerous to pinpoint precise dates for historical revolution, 
though if the reader will permit a heuristic guess, the stage for 20th Century 
philosophy was largely set by a contest between Frege and Husserl, beginning 
with the publication of Frege‟s famous article “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” 
(“On Sense and Reference”) in 1892. Though Frege and Husserl were together 
in attacking psychologism, they disagreed fundamentally on the nature of 
meaning and quibbled over several issues in the philosophy of mathematics 
(Hill and Haddock 2003). By the time the smoke had cleared, we had two lu-
minaries that would inaugurate two traditions for the 20th Century, the 
mathematical and logical philosophy of Frege and the phenomenological phi-
losophy of Husserl. Indeed, in this regard, Anthony Kenny calls Frege the 
“founder of modern analytic philosophy” (1995). Citations are scarcely neces-
sary to posit Husserl as the father of the phenomenological method and the 
immediate predecessor of modern continental philosophy.  
Articulated this way, tying each of these traditions to the information 
climate of the time is not all that difficult. As the global communications en-
vironment jumped forward in leaps and bounds, language itself became the 
problem. Questions about how words acquire and/or could carry meaning 
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were present in the linguistic philosophy of the early analysts, inspired by the 
tidiness of logic and mathematics. Here, we might consider Moore, Russell, 
Ayer, Wittgenstein, etc. The focus of their work was largely grounded in 
achieving philosophical clarity through the application of mathematical logic. 
On the other side of the divide, phenomenology sought its clarity through 
careful description of perceptual experience with a strongly imagistic rather 
than linguistic bent. Phenomenology is, after all, first and foremost, con-
cerned with appearances even if the philosophy itself must be written in 
words. Nonetheless, as the century moved forward, the problems and perils of 
language and media in general became explicit themes in continental philoso-
phy, until we reached the philosophical crisis that characterizes the very end 
of the last century. 
It is quite difficult to paint an adequate portrait of this scene. Continen-
tal philosophy has largely become constructivist in the sense that reality is 
carved out by language (and media), thereby posing a problem for truth – 
how can there be such a thing if reality is just a narrative? That the represen-
tation has replaced the presentation has become a hallmark of postmodern 
philosophies in a variety of forms (and in some camps going so far as saying 
there are only representations!) On the other side, no one seems to know pre-
cisely what contemporary analytic philosophy is other than just good, clear 
thinking reigned in by logical consistency and the findings of science, in short, 
to risk overstatement, anything that is not continental. Either way, both of 
these contemporary philosophical tendencies seem to be stuck, not merely by 
finger pointing at each other, but by having worn out their welcome on the 
academic stage. After all, once one has reached the conclusion that reality is 
media, what is there left to say, and, on the other side, once one has decided 
to defer ultimately to science, then what is philosophy except philosophical 
guesswork and ground clearing in anticipation of genuine scientific findings. 
Neither is entirely helpful; and to show my cards as a self-hating philosopher, 
the situation is a bit embarrassing both inside and outside the academy. (Who 
among us can stand up at a conference of non-philosophers and pronounce 
himself a philosopher without risking snide comments and early dismissal?) 
The question that this raises here might sound cynical: is there anything left 
for philosophy to do, or is philosophy simply done for? But it is nonetheless 
pressing, as I said earlier, not so much for the discipline of philosophy itself, 
but for the preservation of a world that needs philosophers now more than 
ever. 
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6. Avoiding Relativism: Informational Structural Realism 
 
Does the notion that philosophy must adapt with the times to remain 
relevant suggest some form of relativism? Can one be a constructivist and, 
yet, not a relativist? I believe the answer to the first question is negative and 
the second affirmative, and, furthermore, that Floridi shows us a way that 
this can be so. To see this, we need to jump from the first chapter of his book 
to the last. But first a paraphrased lesson from the master.  
As I noted in the provocation that began this paper, this master re-
marked that no great philosopher was wrong, but that each reported on how 
we stood in relation to being during his historical epoch. Such a claim cer-
tainly sounds relativistic, but this depends on what one thinks that philoso-
phy ought to do. So, let us consider the matter by analogy. Artists may not 
like art critics, each thinking that critics limit their individual creativity. And 
yet, an artist may legitimately be said to be “ahead of her time.” This fact 
does not mean that the artist should have been accepted originally, but that 
the meaning carried by the work of art was irrelevant during the time in 
which it was created only to become relevant later, fortunately for the artist 
that might otherwise have been lost to history. In this way, the institution of 
the art critic serves to hold art back, to limit the creativity of an artist so that 
she can serve a social function, namely “speaking” to the people society needs 
her to serve. Without this counter-measure, art risks spiraling into a meaning-
less abyss. The same thing may be said for philosophy. On analogy with the 
artist, philosophy may flourish only when it has something to say, and the 
lessons and paradigms needed to address problems from the past may simply 
not matter to the problems for the future (which is not to say that we should 
ignore our past!). On this reading, philosophy can never end, since its job is 
not to establish a truth, but to inspire clear vision, to help us see what needs 
to be seen, to make us aware of where we stand in the broader scheme of 
things, to prioritize appropriately and to pose solutions to pressing social and 
scientific problems. In this light, philosophy is not merely pragmatic, but 
productive. It is according to both Blackburn (1999) and Floridi (2011) “con-
ceptual engineering,” and as such, Floridi argues that “philosophy needs to 
turn its attention to the new world of information” (p. 17), noting that it is 
not too late to make progress where progress is urgently needed. 
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Of course, informationally-related phenomena need to serve as the sub-
ject of philosophy, but, equally important, changes in information technolo-
gies are also offering new methods to help us address and understand these 
phenomena (and others). Adopting such methods is analogous to the appro-
priation of mathematical methods in the most productive periods of both 
Early Modern and Late-19th/Early-20th Century philosophy. Again, Floridi‟s 
method of choice involves the notion of Levels of Abstraction (LoAs) from ob-
ject-oriented computer programming, the topic of Chapter Three of his book. 
It is not my intentional to describe this method fully here, but a few words 
about it are necessary to explain why a productive view of philosophy does 
not immediately entail relativism, short of simply saying that if philosophy is 
not about dogmatics then the question of relativism is besides the point (even 
though, in a manner of speaking, it is.) 
 LoAs are presented by Floridi as an improvement of the conceptual 
schemes analyzed and criticized by Davidson (1974). They are “clusters of 
networks of observables” and “model the world or its experience” (p. 72). As 
such, they function as lenses through which epistemic subjects may appre-
hend the world. Their employment governs the way in which we relate to the 
objects, states and relations we encounter. To use Floridi‟s example of an 
automobile battery: “„the battery is what provides electricity to the car‟ is a 
typical example of information elaborated at a driver‟s LoA. An engineer‟s 
LoA may output something like „[a] 12-volt lead-acid battery is made up of 
six cells, each cell producing approximately 2.1 volts‟, and an economist‟s 
LoA may suggest that „a good quality car battery will cost between $50 and 
$100 and, if properly maintained, it should last five years or more‟.” (p. 77) 
As should be clear from this case, all three examples are true for a par-
ticular purpose from a particular perspective. They are not arbitrary. That is, 
while there are many ways one could consider a car battery, there are many 
more that one could not. The claim that „a battery is a four antlered Martian 
on wheels‟ is simply false, useless, and uninformative. Consequently, through 
their use, “data as constraining affordances – answers waiting for the relevant 
questions – are transformed into factual information by being processed se-
mantically at a given LoA” (p. 77). Though a form of modified Kantianism, 
Floridi also notes in Humean fashion that “too often philosophical debates 
seem to be caused by a misconception of the LoA at which the questions 
should be addressed and the purpose for which they should be answered” (p. 
79), though his antidote to philosophical confusion is not to find the corre-
sponding impression, but the appropriate LoA. This gesture, in fact, is what 
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makes Floridian philosophy of information productive and constructive, 
while the constraint of having to fit the data allows for “pluralism without 
relativism” (p. 74). It is also what will allow philosophy to change and adapt 
to different technological frameworks and address socio-political problems as 
they change within history, and it also allows us to characterize Floridi‟s 
work here as a kind of “constitutional” or “constructive” continental philoso-
phy, where constitution is the process whereby a world is made known and 
not ontologically constructed, reigned in by contemporary analytic ap-
proaches, since any construction is constrained by our epistemic comport-
ment toward the data. In this latter regard, Dennett‟s view of real patterns 
that saves him from the charge of pure ascriptivism regarding the intentional 
stance comes to mind (1991). We see through the lenses of categories that 
when set to a particular use and directed toward the right data allow aspects 
of a world, real in the empirical sense of the term, to become clear to us. In 
the end, Floridi finishes with a doctrine of Informational Structural Realism 
“committed to the existence of a mind-independent reality addressed by and 
constraining our knowledge” and that “supports LoAs that carry a minimal 
ontological commitment in favour of the structural properties of reality” (p. 
360). 
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7. Conclusions and Caveats 
 
So, in the end, where does this leave us regarding the viability of philoso-
phy as a relevant academic discipline in the context of its current crisis? One 
answer to this question is that it provides a way of keeping philosophy rele-
vant to a particular set of problems for a particular time and place. In other 
words, it requires that philosophy be productive and not dogmatic, it forces 
us to see philosophy as a practice and not a set of doctrines, and it opens hori-
zons for philosophers to take insights from wherever they may find them, re-
gardless of the traditions within which they originate. 
However, there is also something here of more historical (and hence also 
contemporary) interest. When describing his theory of philosophical change, 
Floridi notes, “Ideally, the evolution of this process tends towards an ever-
changing, richer, and robust framing of the world” (pp. 7-8). If it weren‟t for 
the words “ever changing” here, we might be tempted to see a process that 
could culminate at a moment in history, but the fact that the data that con-
strains LoAs changes in history makes a terminus for philosophy impossible. 
More importantly, it gives us a way of comprehending the past. Indeed, if 
Floridi is right about philosophical change in general, then we can re-read the 
history of philosophy as a record of the progress and problems that humanity 
has faced in its struggle to find a fit between its understanding at the time 
and the available data of the day. If we can view this history insofar as it is 
affected by changes in the information technological landscape, we find, then, 
in Floridi‟s Informational Structural Realism clues for a more refined and his-
toricized understanding of the development of the infosphere. To do so, we 
must read the philosophical systems of the past as LoAs and ask what are the 
historical circumstances that they were designed to fit. In other words, to re-
capitulate the philosophy of the master announced at the beginning of this 
essay, no great philosopher is wrong, as if philosophy were ever really about 
dogmatics, but each philosophy embeds a record of our progress in coping 
with information and the emerging communications network it enables, if 
read in the right way. 
Space does not allow much more than an announcement of this possible 
project here. Nonetheless, some caveats are in order. To start, this commen-
tary is sketchy at best. It is intended only to suggest a possible avenue for fu-
ture research that is opened up by Floridi‟s book. Second, the relationship be-
tween changes in information technology and philosophy must be fully 
worked out before an historical reading of philosophy along the lines of In-
ANTHONY F. BEAVERS 
 
 
 
 
274 
 
formational Structural Realism is possible. Third, such an investigation 
would have to be set to a particular purpose, since we must ask at what level 
of abstraction the history of philosophy should be read to complete such a 
project. 
A partial answer to this last question is set by the pressing need to help 
philosophy get up to speed with transformations in the information landscape 
that are quickly enacting social, scientific and political change on a global 
scale. We find ourselves at a time in history where things are changing so fast 
that no analysis can keep up. Understanding where we have been is necessary 
to help us understand where we are headed, and if these changes are informa-
tional in nature, then we need to understand the history of information and 
how it affects conceptual change. We now have a method, but there is still 
much work to be done. We, thus, find ourselves in need of a networked com-
munity of scholars to do it. 
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